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Despite considerable research suggesting that creators value attribution – 
that is, being named as the creator of a work – U.S. intellectual property (IP) 
law does not provide a right to attribution to the vast majority of creators. On 
the other side of the Atlantic, however, many European countries give 
creators, at least in their copyright laws, much stronger rights to attribution. 
At first blush it may seem that the U.S. has gotten it wrong, and the Europeans 
have made a better policy choice in providing to creators a right that they 
value. But for reasons we will explain in this Article, matters are much more 
complicated. 
This Article reports a series of experiments that are the first to attempt to 
measure quantitatively the value of attribution to creators. In previous 
research, we have shown that creators of IP are subject to a “creativity effect” 
that results in their assigning substantially higher value to their works than 
neoclassical economic theory predicts. The first two experiments reported in 
this Article suggest a way that the creativity effect may be reduced: creators 
are willing to sacrifice significant economic payments in favor of receiving 
attribution for their work. The value to creators of attribution raises the 
question whether U.S. IP law should be restructured to provide attribution as a 
creator’s default right. 
The third and most important experiment reported here casts doubt on the 
value of giving creators such a default right, because creators value 
attribution differently depending on whether the legal rule gives it to them as 
an initial entitlement or not. When creators are given a right to attribution as a 
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default, they value credit four times higher than when attribution is not the 
default option. Our findings make clear that creators value attribution, and 
that the prospect of obtaining it can lead to a more efficient level of 
transacting. At the same time, paradoxically, our findings suggest that we 
should exercise caution before we restructure American law, which provides 
no right to attribution for the vast majority of creators. Indeed, it is possible, 
under conditions that we will describe, that providing creators with a default 
right to attribution will result in less efficient transacting. 
Finally, our findings have implications for property theory which are 
broader than IP law or attribution rights. Our third experiment suggests that a 
party who enjoys a default legal right as part of her initial complement of 
rights will tend to treat that legal right in a fashion similar to any other form of 
initial entitlement, and overvalue it relative to what neoclassical theory would 
predict. This suggests a principle regarding how to efficiently structure default 
rules in any setting. All other factors being equal, an efficiently structured 
default rule will locate the initial legal entitlement in the party who is either 
less likely to overvalue the entitlement, or, if overvaluation seems inevitable 
regardless of where the initial entitlement is placed, is likely to overvalue it 
less. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a young and as yet unknown author. You have been 
contacted by a publishing company that wants you to assist a famous politician 
in writing her memoirs. The company gives you a choice between two 
contracts: the first will pay you $25,000 but your name will not appear 
anywhere on the book, while the second will pay you $10,000 but your name 
will appear as a second author on the book’s cover and title page. If you are 
like most people, you are certainly attracted to the extra cash. But credit is 
probably also worth something to you as well. You may value being named as 
an author because you feel it is morally right that you get credit, or because it 
will enhance your reputation and social standing, or because it could help you 
receive other, more lucrative writing contracts in the future. Would you be 
willing to take the smaller payment in exchange for having your name on the 
book? 
Intuition and experience indicate that authors value having their name 
associated with their work. In addition, a growing body of research, including 
studies by the authors of this Article, finds that, in many fields of creative 
endeavor, people value receiving attribution for the work that they have done.1 
 
1 See KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW 
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 178-79, 185-88 (2012) (describing how chefs, open source 
software programmers, and other creators value attribution); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On 
the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se 
Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1151-54 (2007) (describing social 
norms governing attribution among American chefs); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von 
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But aside from this general sense of attribution’s value, neither our intuitions 
nor existing research provide specific guidance as to the value of attribution. 
For example, how much is attribution actually worth to the average author? 
And do authors’ assessments of the value of attribution shift depending on 
whether the law provides them with a default right to it? That is, do authors’ 
valuations of attribution differ between instances where the author possesses 
the right as an initial entitlement and is considering whether to trade it away, 
and instances where the author starts with no default right to attribution and is 
considering trading off money to get it? 
There is almost certainly data in the hands of publishers, software firms, 
movie studios, and record companies that might help answer these questions, 
but there is at present little prospect that it will be made available to 
researchers. Rather than wait, we set out to create our own data, via 
experiments designed to simulate intellectual property (IP) transactions. This 
Article reports the results of three experiments designed to test the value of 
attribution and to determine if that value varies depending on whether the 
author starts with a default right to attribution or not. 
These questions are of significant contemporary importance. In earlier work 
we experimentally studied the ways in which creators assign monetary value to 
the things they create.2 That research suggested that creators are subject to a 
systematic bias that leads them to overvalue their work. This bias, which we 
have called the “creativity effect,” potentially results in inefficient markets in 
IP because creators may be unwilling to license their works for rational 
amounts.3 But if creators value opportunities for publication and attribution, 
they should be willing to trade off monetary compensation for those 
opportunities – and that willingness to reach a deal for less money might 
mitigate, or perhaps even eliminate, the creativity effect. 
In the first two experiments we conducted and report in this Article, we 
created a protocol that allows authors to make a tradeoff between monetary 
compensation on the one hand and publication and attribution on the other. The 
results offer new insight into the value of attribution, and they confirm that the 
prospect of attribution does affect how creators value their work. Attribution is 
not, however, a panacea for the inefficiencies generated by the creativity 
effect: as we shall describe, subjects offered the prospect of attribution still 
 
Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. 
SCI. 187, 191-94 (2008) (describing norms governing attribution among French chefs); 
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 49, 76-101 (2006) (describing attribution norms across various fields). 
2 Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 31, 31-32 (2011) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect]; 
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An 
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2010) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, 
Valuing IP]. 
3 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 32. 
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tend to overvalue their works, albeit to a lesser degree than the overvaluation 
observed when the prospect of attribution is not present. 
Empirically confirming the intuition that authors value attribution and 
getting some sense of the size of that value are important steps toward 
improving our currently poor understanding of how markets in creative goods 
actually work. The findings of our first two experiments suggest that the 
prospect of attribution is a useful countervailing force that reduces the 
creativity effect and thereby improves the efficiency of markets in creative 
works. 
These findings do not, however, automatically signal that American IP law, 
and especially American copyright law, should incorporate a general creators’ 
right to attribution.4 At present, IP law in the U.S. accords only very limited 
protection to a creator’s interest in attribution.5 Instead, the law focuses on 
protecting an author or inventor’s ability to obtain financial compensation for 
the sale or use of her work.6 To the extent that she desires recognition of her 
contribution to a work or product, she will typically have to bargain for it 
separately. 
Many scholars have called for the U.S. to adopt a default attribution right 
similar to those in Europe.7 But is such a rule efficient? Would American IP 
law function better if it provided creators with a default (that is, waivable) 
attribution right? 
To gain a better understanding of that policy question, we conducted a third 
experiment testing the economic effects of assigning creators default waivable 
attribution rights. The results of this experiment confirm research in the 
behavioral sciences that shows that default rules can be very “sticky”: people 
are often reluctant to adjust away from the status quo default. Our data 
indicate that when attribution is provided in creators’ default endowment they 
value it approximately four times as much as they do when credit is not 
provided initially. This suggests that, all else being equal, if creators are given 
default attribution rights, transactions over attribution would tend to face 
higher costs inhering in creators’ tendency to overvalue that initial default 
right. Transactions under this default rule would therefore occur less frequently 
than when the default does not provide an attribution right. 
 
4 U.S. copyright law already recognizes a narrow right to attribution for the authors of a 
small category of very valuable works of fine art. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1992-93 (2006) (describing the limitations in the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A, that render the Act 
inapplicable to the majority of creative works); infra notes 25-26. U.S. patent law also 
requires that the actual inventor be named on the patent application, but nothing in patent 
law gives the inventor any right to have his or her name associated with the invention as it is 
actually made, sold, and used in the marketplace. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-115 (2006). 
5 See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. 
6 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (describing the exclusive rights of copyright owners). 
7 See infra note 31. 
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The takeaway of this observation for the law is not entirely straightforward. 
In a world of significant transaction costs, the Coase Theorem advises 
policymakers to avoid as many costly transactions as possible by granting 
initial entitlements to those likely to value them the most.8 In many cases the 
Coasean formula is likely to produce efficient outcomes. Our findings suggest, 
however, that this relatively simple formula can in some instances lead to 
inefficient allocations. If transaction costs created by overvaluation of a default 
right to attribution – what we can refer to as “behavioral transaction costs” or 
“bias costs” – outweigh the ordinary transaction costs recognized by the 
neoclassical model, it may be best to keep American law as it is. In such 
instances, our results suggest that adding a default right to attribution to 
American IP law would more likely worsen, rather than reduce, inefficiencies 
in IP licensing markets. 
Part I describes our previous research on IP valuation and the questions that 
motivated the current research. It discusses earlier work by others on 
attribution and explains our premises for this new research. Part II reports on 
the methods and results of the three experiments we designed to test the value 
that photographers assign to publication and attribution and to assess the 
effects of a default attribution right. Part III explores the implications of our 
findings for the law. 
I. ATTRIBUTION, PUBLICATION, AND THE VALUE OF IP 
A. Valuing IP 
1. Background 
For decades, IP law has rested on a series of assumptions about how the 
creators of IP should behave. Under these assumptions, derived from ideas in 
neoclassical economics, IP creators, like everyone else in the world, behave as 
rational value maximizers. That is, on the whole and over time, creators make 
rational, wealth-maximizing decisions with respect to valuing, licensing, and 
selling their IP.9 In recent years, however, the assumption that people’s 
decisions conform to the neoclassical model has been substantially undermined 
by empirical studies in behavioral economics. Most importantly, many studies 
have shown that when it comes to assigning value to things that they own, 
people are subject to a cognitive bias, known as the “endowment effect,” that 
 
8 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960) (“Even when 
it is possible to change the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is 
obviously desirable to reduce the need for such transactions and thus reduce the 
employment of resources in carrying them out.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 10, 63-67 (8th ed. 2011). 
9 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 71-84 (2003). 
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results in considerable overvaluation of the owned goods.10 Accordingly, the 
amount of money people are willing to accept (WTA) to part with goods they 
own is typically significantly higher than the amount of money that similarly 
situated people are willing to pay (WTP) to purchase those same goods. 
In our earlier work, we inquired whether these same findings would apply to 
IP.11 Unlike land and ordinary personal property, IP is nonrival, that is, its 
consumption by one person does not prevent another person from consuming 
it.12 And because IP is nonrival, transactions involving this form of property 
are fundamentally different from those studied in the existing endowment 
effects experiments, which have modeled transactions over tangible property 
like coffee mugs, candy bars, and basketball tickets.13 When parties transact 
over IP, the seller usually does not give up the tangible property itself but only 
 
10 See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 127-38 (2008) (describing the endowment 
effect as a “peculiarity” of ownership that often affects owners’ ability to deal rationally); 
Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Focusing on the Forgone: How Value Can Appear So Different 
to Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 360, 368-69 (2000) (exploring possible 
explanations for the endowment effect); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the 
Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 238-47 (1991) (exploring the impact of the 
endowment effect in various legal contexts); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard 
H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1325, 1329-36 (1990) (finding the existence of an endowment effect when subjects 
were given coffee mugs and offered their cash equivalent); Russell Korobkin, The 
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2003) (providing 
background on the endowment effect and analyzing its impact on legal analysis); Richard 
Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47 
(1980) (labeling the common tendency to refuse to give up entitlements even when that 
entitlement would not have been purchased initially as the “endowment effect”). 
11 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 31-36; Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 2-5. In a recent article, Gregory Klass and Kathryn 
Zeiler argue that some new experimental findings have undermined the previous work 
establishing the endowment effect, or at least undermined the model of an endowment effect 
based on loss aversion. Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: 
Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship 3-5 (Georgetown Pub. Law Research Paper 
No. 13-013, Georgetown Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 13-005, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224105. Klass and Zeiler criticize some methodological features 
of the earlier endowment effect studies; we have attempted to incorporate those criticisms – 
many of which appeared in earlier papers, see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The 
Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject 
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 
530 (2005) – into our own experimental designs. Klass and Zeiler also caution against using 
the term “endowment effect” to explain the WTA-WTP gap that arises in many situations. 
We appreciate their critique but continue to use the term because it is widely accepted in the 
behavioral science literature. 
12 This is a fact that the record companies have recently learned to their detriment, as 
consumers duplicate music files and share them, at virtually zero cost to themselves, with 
friends and strangers alike. 
13 See supra note 10. 
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the intangible right to earn money through it; thus, unlike in cases of tangible 
property, alienation is typically incomplete.14 In light of IP’s nonrivalrousness 
and the incomplete alienation that typically characterizes transactions in IP, we 
thought it possible that the valuation anomalies associated with the endowment 
effect would be mitigated, or perhaps even absent, from IP transactions. Why? 
Because the personal attachment to property or anticipated regret following its 
alienation that leads owners in endowment effect experiments to overvalue 
their property may not operate where the transaction does not involve the 
owner’s complete loss of the property.15 
Yet, unlike any experiment in the existing literature, the property we 
planned to study was not simply that with which owners had been “endowed,” 
but instead property that subjects had actually created themselves. We 
suspected that subjects would feel significantly greater personal attachment to 
property that they had created compared to property they had been given. 
Consequently, we arrived at a second hypothesis in direct opposition to our 
first: the valuation anomalies associated with the endowment effect would be 
even more pronounced for owners of the property if they had actually created 
it. 
In a series of experiments involving the creation of poems and paintings, we 
confirmed the second hypothesis and provided evidence for the existence of a 
“creativity effect” – the tendency of creators of goods to assign higher value to 
their works not only compared to would-be purchasers of the goods, but 
relative also to mere owners (that is, subjects who had not created the works, 
but to whom they had merely been given, as in previous studies).16 This was a 
significant finding, because it suggests that there is something distinctive about 
the act of creativity that tends to magnify the valuation anomalies associated 
 
14 See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 4. Note that in certain types 
of IP transactions, alienation is as “complete” as in transactions involving tangible property 
– for example where the IP transaction involves sale of an article like an oil painting or a 
sculpture that has only been produced in a single copy. Of course, for most IP transactions, 
such as those involving novels, plays, songs, films, poems, photographs, computer software, 
or prints, the work at issue may freely be copied, and therefore alienation is incomplete in 
that it does not entirely deprive the seller of access to the work. 
15 Research even suggests that owning multiple, non-complementary units of the same 
good reduces the endowment effect for individuals, bolstering the case for nonrival IP to 
operate differently than more traditional market goods. See Katherine Burson, David Faro & 
Yuval Rottenstreich, Multiple-Unit Holdings Yield Attenuated Endowment Effects, 59 
MGMT. SCI. 545, 546 (2013). 
16 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 38-40; see also Nikolaus 
Franke et al., The “I Designed It Myself” Effect in Mass Customization, 56 MGMT. SCI. 125, 
136-37 (2010) (reporting that subjects value self-designed products higher than non-self-
designed products); Michael I. Norton et al., The “Ikea Effect”: When Labor Leads to Love, 
2-3 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 11-091, 2011), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-091.pdf (finding that investing labor in a project 
increases people’s valuation of the results). 
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with the endowment effect. The creativity effect drives creators’ WTA even 
further away from buyers’ WTP, and in doing so it makes deals over creative 
goods more difficult to reach. 
2. Design of Prior Experiments 
Our earlier studies were designed to model the nature of IP markets, where 
the goods sold are not the underlying works themselves but simply the 
opportunity to seek rents through ownership of the rights. To do so, we 
established contests for creative works. In one such experiment, we solicited 
paintings for a contest that would be judged by an expert with the winning 
painting receiving a $100 prize.17 The painters (Painters) of the works were 
told that they would be competing with nine other paintings for the prize. They 
were then told that their painting would be shown to another subject who had 
been recruited for the study. That subject (Buyer) would make the Painter a 
cash offer for the Painter’s right to win the prize money if her painting was 
selected as the winner. The Painters were asked to indicate the least amount of 
money they would be willing to accept (WTA) to sell their painting’s chance to 
win the prize. Each of the Buyers was then shown one of the Painters’ 
paintings and told to indicate the most amount of money they would be willing 
to pay (WTP) to purchase the Painter’s chance to win the prize. Finally, a 
group of subjects was recruited for the study to play the role of Owners. They 
were told that there would be a contest with a $100 prize and that, for purposes 
of the contest, they owned one of the paintings’ chances to win the prize. They 
were then asked to indicate the least amount of money they would be willing to 
accept to sell their chance to win the prize. In no case would the ownership of 
the actual painting change hands; the parties were only transacting over the 
chance to win the prize. 
3. Prior Results 
Our data suggested a large gap between the WTA of the Owners of IP-style 
rights and the WTP of Buyers, consistent with previous research on the 
endowment effect. Furthermore, the data showed a large and significant gap 
between the Painters’ WTA and the Owners’ WTA. Thus, Painters’ mean 
WTA was $74.59, Owners’ mean WTA was $40.67, and Buyers’ mean WTP 
was $17.39. Differences between each condition were significant at the p = 
0.05 level.18 These results suggested the existence of a creativity effect – a 
pricing anomaly that, unlike the endowment effect, is linked not merely to the 
ownership of property, but to the creation of property. The creativity effect 
explains why Painters demanded significantly more than Owners to transfer 
the chance of winning the prize. Authorship, our study suggests, produces a 
tendency to value creativity more highly than does mere ownership. 
 
17 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 37-38. 
18 Id. at 40 & n.35. 
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These findings are significant for a number of reasons. First, they suggest 
that creators of IP place significantly higher value on their works than the 
neoclassical model predicts. Given the zero-sum nature of the contest, the 
mean WTA for the Painters should have been around $10 (reflecting a one in 
ten chance of winning a $100 prize if randomly selected). Interestingly, much 
of the observed overvaluation appeared to have come from Painters’ 
substantial overoptimism in the probability that their work would win the 
prize. On average, they predicted that their paintings would have a 52.8% 
chance of winning.19 Additionally, we found some evidence that Painters’ 
regret aversion (their anticipated anxiety about having sold the winning 
painting) could have led to their higher valuations, but that evidence was 
merely suggestive.20 
Second, and most importantly, our findings suggested that IP markets may 
be significantly less efficient than neoclassical law and economics accounts 
have previously supposed. These accounts propose that initial distributions of 
property will have little effect on ultimate distributions, at least in a world 
without transaction costs, because property will flow to its highest-valued 
use.21 On the contrary, our findings indicate that initial distributions of IP may 
be sticky. The original owner of IP, very often its creator, will tend to 
systematically overvalue it compared to potential purchasers, resulting in a 
suboptimal number of wealth-maximizing transactions. In many instances, we 
believe, the creators of IP will refuse to sell or license their works or inventions 
even when doing so would be beneficial to both parties. Accordingly, in our 
previous publications, we offered potential remedies to bargaining impasses, 
including the wider use of liability rules across both copyright and patent, as 
well as changes to the copyright rules regarding formalities, works made for 
hire, and fair use.22 
B. New Experiments: The Value of Attribution and Publication 
Our previous research focused exclusively on the monetary value that the 
creators of IP assign to their works. As a considerable literature suggests, 
however, creators often seem to care about more than just the amount of 
money that they can earn through their work. Wikipedia authors and open-
source computer programmers write without compensation, but they enforce 
 
19 Id. For Owners and Buyers the predicted probabilities were 41.9% and 31.8%, 
respectively. Id. The differences between these probabilities were all statistically significant 
at the p = 0.05 level. 
20 Id. at 42-43. 
21 See Coase, supra note 8, at 10; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur 
Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 646-47 (2009); Francesco Parisi, Coase Theorem, in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 855-61 (Laurence E. Blume & Steven N. 
Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2008).  
22 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 44-52; Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 42-43. 
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norms about attribution and credit.23 Stand-up comics and chefs work in fields 
without strong IP protection, but they often insist upon receiving credit for 
their innovations.24 These and other creators have a host of motivations that 
involve the desire to spread their ideas and the reputational value of being 
thought a successful artist or inventor in addition (or related) to monetary 
compensation. 
Despite the importance that creators apparently attach to attribution, 
American IP law accords it very little recognition. Attribution is not one of the 
exclusive rights that U.S. copyright law gives to authors, except for a narrow 
provision, the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), conferring attribution rights 
on a small number of authors of valuable works of fine art.25 But VARA is 
inapplicable to the vast majority of creative works, even ones that trade for 
significant sums.26 For example, if a movie producer licenses a song to be 
included in a film, copyright law creates no formal requirement that the song’s 
author be credited for it. And aside from the narrow protection offered by 
VARA, if authors subject to American copyright law wish to gain attribution 
rights, they must negotiate separately for them.27 
 
23 See Fisk, supra note 1, at 88-92 (describing the norms governing attribution among 
programmers of open source software); Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media, and 
the Curatorial Audience, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 95, 100-02 (2010) (describing the 
norms governing attribution among authors of Wikipedia articles). 
24 See Buccafusco, supra note 1, at 1151-54 (describing the norms governing attribution 
among chefs); Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 1, at 191-94 (describing norms governing 
attribution among French chefs); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free 
Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation 
of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1809-31 (2008) (describing the norms 
governing attribution among stand-up comics). For additional discussion of these issues, see 
RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 1, at 178-79, 185-88 (describing how chefs, open 
source software programmers, and other creators value attribution). 
25 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 7-10 (1990) (describing the relationship of VARA to 
the Berne Convention). VARA gives the creators of certain categories of visual art a 
waivable right of attribution when those works are produced only in single works or in 
limited editions. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). 
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (limiting the scope of VARA to works of visual art). 
27 For many years, American authors used trademark law to protect their right to be 
named as the author of their works. They claimed that the failure to include their names on 
their works amounted to illegal “passing off” of the goods as coming from another source. 
See Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1200 
(2005) (pointing out the “common belief that designations of authorship, like trademarks, 
could be determined to be true or false designations, could mislead consumers as to salient 
qualities of goods, and that protection under trademark law was thus required”). This 
practice came to an end, however, with the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. 
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), which effectively terminated the 
use of trademark as a tool for obtaining attribution. The Dastar Court held that trademark 
law is prohibited from extending “passing off” protection to the sorts of “communicative 
products” that are regulated by copyright law. Id. at 28-33; see also Christopher Sprigman, 
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American copyright law’s scant concern for attribution is mirrored, for the 
most part, in U.S. patent law. American law has long required that the inventor 
or inventors be named on the patent even if the invention was developed and 
motivated by the inventor’s corporate employer.28 The law has never required, 
however, that the inventor be given any form of credit for the invention as it is 
actually made, marketed, and used.29 
The treatment of attribution, at least with respect to copyright, is different 
abroad. Compared with U.S. copyright law, authorial rights to attribution 
figure much more prominently in the copyright law of many of our principal 
trading partners. Most European countries extend to creators certain kinds of 
attribution rights,30 and recently a number of American scholars have called for 
the U.S. to recognize some form of attribution right in its copyright law.31 
 
Indirect Enforcement of the Intellectual Property Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 565, 565-
68 (2007) (suggesting that the result in Dastar represents the Supreme Court’s tacit 
enforcement of limits on Congress’s legislative authority under the Patent and Copyright 
Clause). 
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (“An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to 
be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided . . . .”). 
29 See id. §§ 111-115. 
30 See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROPR. INTELL.] art. L. 121-1 
(Fr.), translation available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/fr/fr062en.pdf 
(providing that “[a]n author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name, his authorship, and 
his work,” and that “[t]his right shall attach to his person”); Gesetz über Urheberrecht und 
verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, 
BGBL. I at 1273, §§ 13, 14 (Ger.), translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html#p0056 (providing that the author “has the 
right to be identified as the author of the work,” may “determine whether the work shall 
bear a designation of authorship and which designation is to be used,” and “has the right to 
prohibit the distortion or any other derogatory treatment of his work which is capable of 
prejudicing his legitimate intellectual or personal interests in the work”); Legge 22 aprile 
1941, n. 633, in G.U. July 16, 1941, n. 166, art. 20 (It.), translation available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128286 (providing that “the author shall 
retain the right to claim authorship of his work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
any other modification of, and other derogatory action in relation to, the work, which would 
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation”).  
31 See Fisk, supra note 1, at 111 (proposing that “a right of attribution be regarded as an 
implied term of every employment agreement”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in 
Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1798 (2012); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to 
Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 266 
(2004) (proposing “an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act to add a federal right of 
attribution of authorship”); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of Authornym: Authorship, 
Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1445-49 (2005) 
(advocating recognition of a form of attributional rights); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The 
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and 
Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 988 (2002) (“[T]he adoption of an express right of 
attribution is the only approach capable of fully protecting the authorial interests that 
currently are insufficiently addressed under our legal system.”); Greg Lastowka, Digital 
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Although there is substantial qualitative evidence that creators value 
attribution, there has, however, been no attempt to measure that value. Our 
experimental framework from the previous studies offered an attractive 
platform that could be adapted to explore the relationship between creators’ 
interest in reputation and publication, on the one hand, and in monetary 
compensation, on the other. 
1. Attribution in Law and Practice 
Attribution – the label we use when we assign credit to a person’s role in the 
production of a creative work – can have individual and social value for a 
number of reasons.32 Attribution may be valuable to the individual producer of 
the work, for example, because receiving credit may help her obtain further 
employment in the field or sell more works in the future. We can think of this 
as attribution’s extrinsic value. Separately, an individual may value attribution, 
because seeing her name attached to her work produces a positive psychic or 
emotional effect on her well-being.33 We can call this attribution’s intrinsic 
value. Finally, attribution may have some individual moral or ethical value to 
the producer of the work as a legal and social recognition of her relationship to 
the work.34 We can call this attribution’s moral value.35 
Apart from its individual value, assigning attribution to creators may have 
social value. Connecting a creator with her work can aid consumers in making 
decisions about which products to buy,36 and it can assist industries and 
individuals in assigning credit and blame to the successes and failures of 
products.37 Throughout this Article, however, we are directly concerned with 
the ways in which attribution confers individual value. 
The laws of most other countries, including many of the U.S.’s chief trading 
 
Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 84-85 (2007) (proposing 
that the fair use provisions in U.S. copyright law incorporate “the provision of attribution”). 
32 For detailed treatments of the values associated with attribution, see Fisk, supra note 1, 
at 53-67, and Lastowka, supra note 27, at 1175-85. 
33 See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 64 (1999) (“The ‘utility 
function’ Linux hackers are maximizing is not classically economic, but is the intangible 
reward of their own ego satisfaction and reputation among other hackers.”); Fisk, supra note 
1, at 50 (“Credit is instrumentally beneficial in establishing a reputation and intrinsically 
valuable simply for the pleasure of being acknowledged.”). 
34 See Kwall, supra note 31, at 986.  
35 We do not intend to suggest that these different values are mutually exclusive. They 
almost certainly are not. 
36 See Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 65 
(2007); Lastowka, supra note 27, at 1179 (“Authorial attribution furthers the interests of 
consumers by reducing the costs of searching for creative content.”). 
37 Fisk, supra note 1, at 61 (“[T]here are circumstances in which people think it 
important to plan for failure and to design attribution regimes whose purpose is to allocate 
blame.”). 
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partners, give legal recognition to authors’ interests in attribution,38 but they 
have diverged on the precise content of the right. The United Kingdom 
provides authors of certain copyrightable works with a waivable right to be 
named as the author of their works in a clear and reasonably prominent 
manner.39 Other countries, however, have established nonwaivable attribution 
rights. Most notably, France and Italy have statutorily granted authors a 
perpetual, inalienable right to attribution.40 In addition, some countries (again, 
most notably, France) have granted some artists a droit de suite – that is, a 
right to royalties on the resale of works.41 
Despite evidence that creators value attribution, as well as pressure from 
international treaty obligations, the U.S. has been reluctant to recognize strong 
forms of attribution rights, or indeed any other form of moral right. The 
paucity of formal IP protection for attribution rights in the U.S. does not, 
however, mean that creators are unable to obtain credit for their efforts; it 
simply means that creators must use the property rights that American IP law 
gives them as leverage to negotiate for attribution. Instead of being a subject of 
IP law, attribution in the U.S. becomes a subject of contract law and the 
operation of social norms that either favor or disfavor attribution within 
specific creative communities and industries. 
In many creative fields, attribution is a matter of bargaining between initial 
creators and subsequent producers of content.42 As in the example used at the 
beginning of this Article, the author desiring her name on the cover of the book 
 
38 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is the primary 
reference for what are referred to in international law as the “moral rights” of creators. 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted Sept. 9, 1886, 
last amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1989), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. Since 1928, the Berne Convention has codified moral rights 
of attribution (the author’s right to have his name associated with his work) and integrity 
(the author’s right to prevent mutilation or revision of his work). Berne Convention art. 
6bis(1); see also Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 97 (1997); Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 
38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10 & n.38 (1985). In conformance with the Berne Convention, many 
countries have included rights of attribution in their IP laws. See supra note 30. 
39 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 77-78 (U.K.); see also LIONEL 
BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 244-49 (3d ed. 2009). 
40 C. PROPR. INTELL. art. L. 121-1 (stating that the right to attribution is “perpetual, 
inalienable, and imprescriptible”) (Fr.); Legge 22 aprile 1941, n. 633, in G.U. July 16, 1941, 
n. 166, art. 22-23 (declaring both that the right is inalienable and that it “may be asserted, 
without limitation of time” by the creator’s descendants and their descendants) (It.). 
41 See, e.g., C. PROPR. INTELL. art. L. 122-8 (providing that “[a]uthors of graphic and 
three-dimensional works . . . have an inalienable right . . . to participate in the proceeds of 
any sale of such work”) (Fr.). 
42 See Lastowka, supra note 27, at 1174 (“[A]uthors may use copyright as a lever to 
demand attributions of authorship.”).  
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may insist on the inclusion of a contract provision providing for credit as part 
of the bargain she strikes with the publisher, and it may affect the price she 
gets paid for her work. Relatedly, creators in some fields, especially those 
involving computers and the Internet, often attach licenses to the use of their 
work that require attribution.43 Many of these licenses are established by the 
Creative Commons organization.44 Approximately ninety-eight percent of the 
people who choose Creative Commons licenses demand attribution; therefore, 
since 2004 Creative Commons has not offered a license that does not include 
an attribution requirement.45 
In many industries, attribution practices are the subject of complex 
bargaining between parties.46 In the movie industry, for example, who gets 
credit and how they receive it – including the order, font, and size of their 
names – are determined by contracts negotiated between the movie studios and 
the guilds representing the various members of the industry.47 In some fields, 
attribution is governed by more or less formalized norms. Attribution practices 
for scientific research have been proposed by the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors.48 The guidelines specify who should be named as a 
paper’s author and in what order.49 In other creative fields, norms governing 
attribution are less established. In graphic design and elite cuisine, for 
example, there appears to be little attempt to formalize the norms regarding 
attribution.50 
The apparent value that creators attach to attribution has led to calls from a 
variety of scholars for enhanced legal protection for attribution and credit in 
the U.S. Interestingly, as Rebecca Tushnet observes, proponents of 
strengthened attribution laws come from both “high protectionist” and “low 
protectionist” camps.51 On the one hand, high protectionists favor attribution 
rights as part of a broader mission of enhancing authors’ opportunities for 
complete economic and moral control of their works.52 On the other hand, low 
protectionists support attribution as a way of giving authors something they 
value while simultaneously pursuing a wider agenda of shrinking the scope of 
IP rules and expanding the range of uncontrolled and uncompensated uses 
 
43 Lastowka, supra note 31, at 59. 
44 See id. at 78-81. 
45 Glenn Otis Brown, Announcing (and Explaining) Our New 2.0 Licenses, CREATIVE 
COMMONS (May 25, 2004), http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216. 
46 See Fisk, supra note 1, at 77-101. 
47 Id. at 76-81. 
48 Id. at 83-84. 
49 Id. 
50 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 1, at 192-94; Fisk, supra note 1, at 86-87. 
51 Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 792-
93. 
52 Id. at 793. 
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outside the reach of IP law.53 Although the proposals for enhancing attribution 
rights diverge in many ways, support for legal recognition of some sort of right 
to attribution appears to be increasing. Despite this interest, there has been 
little previous study of the quantitative value of such a right, or whether 
installing such a right as the default rule in copyright or patent law would tend 
in general to ease or impede bargaining over rights to copy, distribute, and use 
creative works. 
2. Modeling the Value of Attribution and Publication 
If creators value opportunities for attribution and publication, then they 
should be willing to trade off some monetary return on their works in favor of 
those opportunities. It is possible, furthermore, that they value publication and 
attribution so much that the WTA-WTP gap that we have seen in our previous 
studies – that is, the creativity effect – disappears. Thus, if the composer of a 
musical work places so much value merely on the opportunity to have her song 
heard or to improve her reputation as a composer, she might not insist on very 
much money at all to transfer her IP rights in the song to someone who would 
like to include it in a Hollywood movie. As Greg Lastowka has suggested, 
open-source computer coding can be thought of in this way.54 Open-source 
coders allow their work to be freely distributed to the public, but most open-
source licenses have clauses requiring that users provide attribution to the 
code’s creators. Although their coding potentially has positive economic value, 
coders set the price of access at the point where it maximizes reputational 
gains, that is, at $0.55 The same can be said of those who use Creative 
Commons licenses that require attribution or of those who voluntarily write 
and edit Wikipedia entries.56 
If this kind of attribution-based price discounting occurs often, IP markets 
may in fact be more efficient than we had given them credit for in our earlier 
work. Because creators are typically not given attribution rights by U.S. IP 
law, they will have to bargain for them. Presumably, this desire will drive 
down the price of licensing their works relative to licenses that do not provide 
for attribution and will shrink the gap between creators’ WTA and buyers’ 
WTP, resulting in more efficient transacting. Similarly, if creators value the 
prospect of publication even without their name attached, then we should see 
an analogous publication-based price discounting. But whether we will in fact 
see this is unclear. It is possible that some creators will resist the idea of having 
their work published without attribution. They might believe that it is 
inappropriate or immoral for the work to be published without an indication of 
its creator.57 Accordingly, such creators would be less attracted to publication 
 
53 Id. at 792-93. 
54 Lastowka, supra note 31, at 59. 
55 Id. 
56 See Garon, supra note 23, at 107-08. 
57 The attractiveness of attribution requirements in Creative Commons licenses suggests 
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without attribution than they would be to monetary compensation standing 
alone. Both of these possibilities receive at least anecdotal support.58 
The experiments reported below test these propositions. Following earlier 
literature, we assume that creators value opportunities for publication and for 
attribution. Accordingly, when given a chance to trade off monetary 
compensation for those opportunities, they will do so, resulting in lower WTA 
numbers that are closer to the prices that prospective buyers might be willing 
to pay for them. 
It is worth commenting on one of the assumptions of this model. Earlier we 
explained that creators might value attribution for economic or moral reasons. 
They might desire attribution as an opportunity to achieve greater financial or 
artistic success in the future, and they might desire attribution because they 
believe they have some ethical right to have their names attached to their 
works. Although one of these preferences is economic and the other moral, we 
assume that whichever reason the creator has for valuing attribution, she will 
be willing to engage in market exchanges to receive it. 
II. THE CURRENT STUDIES 
We performed three separate experiments to test the propositions discussed 
above. The first two studies tested the value that creators attach to attribution 
and publication. They used the same methods, but employed different samples. 
The first involved “lay” creative subjects, those who indicated an interest in 
photography. The second involved professional and serious amateur creators. 
The third study, which employed a wholly different experimental design, 
explored the economic effects of creating a waivable default attribution right. 
 
as much. Cf. id. at 108. 
58 Compare, e.g., Ghostwriting FAQ, DENNIS LOWERY, 
http://www.dennislowery.com/blog/ghostwriting-faq.html (last visited May 22, 2013) (“Q: 
Does the ghostwriter get a credit on the book? As mentioned above, depending on the 
arrangement, attribution or even co-author credit could be negotiated. If the author/client 
will give the ghostwriter attribution or credit their contribution, the fee decreases or they can 
choose to have their name solely on the book at the standard ghostwriting rate.”), and 7 
Questions to Ask Before You Hire a Ghostwriter, BOBBI LINKEMER, 
http://www.writeanonfictionbook.com/ARTICLES/7_Question_Ghostwriter.html (last 
visited May 22, 2013) (“Acknowledgement in print is often considered part of the fee.”), 
with Julia Moskin, I Was a Cookbook Ghostwriter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2012, at D1 
(“Because cookbook ghostwriting brings low pay, nonexistent royalties (most writers are 
paid a flat fee, or a percentage of the advance doled out by the publisher) and only a few 
perks, most ghosts don’t last long. When a ghosted book is successful, watching someone 
else get credit for your work is demoralizing.”). 
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A. Experiment 1: Valuing Attribution – Mechanical Turk Study 
1. Mechanical Turk Methods 
For the first experiment, we recruited 200 participants using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk), a service that connects people with online “human 
intelligence tasks” (HITs).59 We listed a HIT on mTurk titled “Aspiring 
Photographers Wanted for a Contest and Study About How People Use Digital 
Photos.” We also provided a short description of the task.60 
mTurk participants were directed to the Qualtrics survey website,61 where 
they consented to participate in the study. They uploaded a digital photograph 
they had taken themselves, and were instructed that it was not to include any 
other people.62 The contest rules appeared next; participants learned that their 
picture would be judged against ninety-nine other photographs by a 
photography expert and that the winning photograph would receive a prize of 
$1000. 
At this point, the participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions, described below. 
a. Contest Condition 
In this condition, participants were told that their photograph would be 
viewed by a buyer before any judging would take place. The buyer would 
make a cash offer which, if accepted by the photographer, would result in the 
transfer of the opportunity to win the $1000 prize from the photographer to the 
buyer. The offer was not for the photograph itself, but only for the right to be 
paid the prize if the photograph was judged the winner. We will refer to this as 
the photograph’s contest rights. 
Once informed of the rules, the photographer’s WTA was elicited, that is, 
she was asked to specify the lowest amount she would accept to sell her 
photograph’s contest rights. She was told that if the buyer’s offer for her 
photograph’s contest rights was higher than her WTA, then she would 
automatically receive that offer in cash payable through mTurk, and she would 
 
59 AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited 
May 22, 2013) (“Mechanical Turk is a marketplace for work. We give businesses and 
developers access to an on-demand, scalable workforce. Workers select from thousands of 
[HITs] and work whenever it’s convenient.”). 
60 Subjects were told: “You will upload a digital photo of nature that you’ve taken and 
answer some questions about it. Your photo will then be entered in a contest and judged by 
photography experts. Prizes may include cash and/or publication on a major website.” 
61 QUALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com (last visited May 22, 2013). 
62 This proviso was included to allay privacy concerns raised by the University of 
Virginia’s Institutional Review Board for Social and Behavioral Sciences (IRB), which was 
the human subjects research review body that approved this study. See Institutional Review 
Board for Social & Behavioral Sciences, U. VA., http://www.virginia.edu/vpr/irb/sbs (last 
visited May 22, 2013). 
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not receive the $1000 should her photograph win the contest. If the offer was 
lower, then she would not receive any cash from the buyer but could still 
receive the $1000 if her photograph won. This condition replicated those used 
in our previous studies of the creativity effect.63 
b. Publication Condition 
The price elicitation and offer structure in the second condition were 
identical to the Contest condition. The change from the first condition involved 
the prize being offered. In the Publication condition, the photographers were 
offered the opportunity to have their photo published, uncredited, on a major 
website. But the possibility of publication would arise only if the photograph 
(1) had been sold to the buyer and (2) it won the contest. That is: 
 
 If the photographer’s WTA was lower than the buyer’s offer, then the 
photographer would receive the offer in cash. If the photograph then 
won the contest, the photographer would not receive the $1000 but 
would have the photograph published, albeit without the 
photographer’s name. 
 
 If the photographer’s WTA was higher than the offer, then the 
photographer would receive no cash from the buyer. If the photograph 
won the contest, the photographer would receive the $1000 prize, but 
the photograph would not be published. 
c. Attribution Condition 
This condition was identical to the Publication condition, but if the 
conditions specified above were met, the photograph would be published along 
with the photographer’s name. Again, if the photographer’s WTA was lower 
than the offer, she would receive the cash offer. If the photograph won the 
contest, the photographer would not win the $1000 prize but would have the 
credited photograph published. If the WTA was higher than the offer, then the 
photographer would not receive the cash offer. If the photograph won the 
contest, then the photographer would receive the $1000 prize, but not have the 
credited photograph published. 
We structured the conditions this way in order to determine whether our 
photographer subjects valued publication and attribution, and whether their 
attraction to these prospects would reduce their WTA relative to a situation in 
which publication and attribution were not available. If they attached a 
significant value to the prospect of publication, then we would expect to see 
subjects in the Publication condition report lower WTA than those in the 
Contest condition. If they attached a significant value to the prospect of 
 
63 See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 34-35; Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 17-31. 
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attribution, we would expect to see subjects in the Attribution condition report 
lower WTA than in both the Publication and Contest conditions. 
After the rules were explained, and comprehension checked, participants 
entered their WTA. Participants were asked a series of questions about their 
perceptions of the quality of their photographs and their emotional attachment 
to them.64 We also asked several demographic questions. Participants were 
then thanked, and the experiment ended. Unlike in our previous studies, we did 
not recruit a separate pool of buyers in this experiment since our interest was 
only in the differences between creators’ WTA.65 
2. Mechanical Turk Results 
Of the 200 participants recruited using mTurk, twenty were excluded for 
answering one or both of the rule comprehension questions incorrectly. Based 
on the scholarly literature reviewed above, we hypothesized that creators 
would find the prospect of publication with attribution to be the most valuable, 
and that the WTA for the Attribution condition would thus be significantly 
lower than in the Publication or Contest conditions.66 Our hypotheses with 
respect to the Publication condition were less clear. If subjects valued the 
opportunity to get their work “out there” even without their names attached, 
then WTA in the Publication condition should be lower than in the Contest 
condition. But if subjects were indifferent to the opportunity for publication 
without credit or, moreover, if they were hostile to the idea, then WTA in the 
Publication and Contest conditions should not diverge. 
We first compared participants in either the Contest or Publication 
condition, on the one hand, with those in the Attribution condition, on the 
other. This comparison allowed us to assess the subjects’ behavior in the 
conditions where attribution was not available (Contest, Publication) versus the 
condition where it was (Attribution). The subjects in the Attribution condition 
did, as expected, report a significantly lower WTA than Contest or Publication 
subjects – that is, subjects in the two conditions where there was no prospect of 
attribution (Contest/Publication M = $202.26, Attribution M = $132.28, t(180) 
= 1.98, p = .05). Thus, when subjects were offered a chance to receive credit 
 
64 The questions were as follows: 
“How good is your photograph?” Responses were elicited on a seven point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (Very Bad) to 7 (Very Good). 
“What are the chances (the probability) that your photograph is going to win the 
prize?” Responses were elicited on a 0-100 slider scale, indicating a percentage. 
“How would you rate your level of personal and emotional investment or 
attachment to your photograph?” Responses were elicited on a seven point Likert scale 
from 1 (Very Low) to 7 (Very High). 
65 We received permission from the IRB to engage in this minor deceit, and subjects 
were told about it at the end of the experiment. 
66 Recall that because of the way our study is designed, attaching a higher value to 
attribution should result in a lower WTA in the Attribution condition, because creators are 
willing to sacrifice more monetary compensation in order to receive attribution. 
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along with publication of their work, they significantly reduced the amount of 
money they were willing to accept to part with their chance to win the $1000 
contest compared with the WTA reported when they were not given a chance 
to receive credit. Furthermore, participants in the Attribution condition 
reported lower WTA than participants in the Publication condition standing 
alone (that is, not grouped with the Contest condition) (Publication M = 
$226.76, Attribution M = $132.28, t(180) = 1.97, p = .052), and this difference 
was on the edge of significance. 
Interestingly, the other dyadic comparisons were not significant at the p = 
.05 confidence level. Subjects’ WTA in the Attribution condition was lower 
than in the Contest condition but only at the p = .10 level of significance. The 
difference between Publication and Contest was also significant at p = .10, but 
in the wrong direction: subjects’ WTA for publication without credit was 
higher than it was merely for the chance to win the prize. These results are 
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a: means differ at a p < .10 level 
b: means differ at a p = .05 level 
3. Mechanical Turk Discussion 
We draw several conclusions from these results. First, they align with what 
we have found in previous related experiments67 involving poems and 
paintings – that is, the creators of works value them substantially more than the 
neoclassical model predicts.68 Our photographers behaved similarly to the 
 
67 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 36-43; Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 17-25.  
68 When reporting our previous results, commentators occasionally asked whether the 
heightened valuation data were based on the relatively low size of the prizes. Perhaps, they 
thought, subjects were particularly risk-seeking with low value ($100) prizes and would be 
more rational with a larger amount of money at stake. The results of this study suggest that 
this is not the case. With a $1000 prize, subjects valued their works significantly more than 
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poets and painters in our previous experiments, and set their WTA 
significantly higher than their expected mean value. We did not have subjects 
act as buyers in this protocol, but given the enormous spread between the 
rational expected value of the contest chance ($10) and the subjects’ WTA, 
which varied on average between $132 (Attribution) and $226 (Publication), 
we strongly suspect that there would be a very large gap between sellers and 
buyers were we to modify the protocol to include subjects acting as buyers.69 
Thus, although they are not a direct confirmation of our previous findings 
(because of the different protocols used), our results do align with and support 
what we have found previously. 
Our main finding is that the prospect of publication with attribution results 
in a significantly lower WTA compared to the WTA reported by subjects in the 
Contest and Publication conditions pooled together. This finding suggests that 
the prospect of publication with attribution has a modest but nonetheless 
statistically significant effect of reducing WTA compared to a situation where 
subjects are not offered the prospect of publication with attribution. 
Interestingly, the Contest and Publication conditions showed no significant 
difference. Recall that we were uncertain whether subjects would find 
uncredited publication attractive enough to meaningfully reduce their WTA. 
The WTA reported by subjects in the Publication condition was, on average, 
higher than the mean WTA reported in the Contest condition. Why might this 
be? Perhaps subjects found unattractive the prospect of publication of their 
photo without attribution.70 This is consistent with the Creative Commons data 
 
69 These gaps are consistent with data from another study we conducted, which was 
identical to the one reported here, except that the prize was for $50 and there were ten 
photographs competing for it, yielding an expected value of $5 per entry. In that study, the 
mean valuations were: 
Contest = $23.15 (46.3% of the total prize) 
Publication = $21.46 (42.9% of the total prize) 
Attribution = $19.32 (38.6% of the total prize) 
When we compare the Attribution condition with the two non-attribution conditions 
combined, the difference in mean values is marginally significant (p = 0.058). These ratios 
are reasonably consistent both with the results reported in our prior experiments and with 
our results in the experiments reported in this Article. For more discussion of these issues, 
see supra note 68 and infra note 72. 
70 Note that the publication condition signals two different things to an IP creator, which 
would have different impacts on the WTA measure. First, the opportunity to have a photo 
published should obviously decrease a photographer’s WTA (if she values being published 
at all). Because it was necessary to explicitly state that the photographer would not receive 
any attribution in this condition, however, this should raise the photographer’s WTA, as it is 
less valuable to be published without attribution than with attribution. Depending upon 
which signal was stronger, a photographer could reasonably have a higher WTA, especially 
under an assumption of “coherent arbitrariness.” See infra Part II.C (Experiment 3). 
That there are two signals operating in opposite directions is evidenced by Levene’s test 
for equality of variances. There was marginally more variance in the publication condition 
than the contest condition (F(1, 180) = 3.27, p = .073). This indicates that there was 
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described in Part I.B.1 regarding the minimal attractiveness of licenses that did 
not require attribution.71 Given the strong preference for attribution, 
publication without attribution may be viewed negatively, which would 
account for the higher average WTA in the Publication condition versus the 
Contest condition. But the difference, it must be remembered, was not 
significant at the .05 confidence level (but it was significant at the .10 level), so 
it is also possible that the higher WTA in the Publication condition was driven 
by chance rather than the difference between the conditions. 
We were also surprised that the Contest/Attribution dyad did not manifest a 
significant difference: although WTA in the Attribution condition was lower 
than in the Contest condition, that difference was not significant at the .05 
confidence level (but it was significant at the .10 level). Given the weakness of 
this association, and given the borderline significance in the 
Publication/Attribution dyad, we read these results to suggest that the subjects 
in the mTurk study, who were not professional photographers but were 
selected to be representative of the general population, had at best a modest 
desire for publication with attribution. These results may suggest that 
nonprofessional creators place some value on the prospect of credited 
publication, but that attribution is not likely to serve as a complete curb on the 
tendency of non-professional creators to overvalue their works.72 
 
marginally more disagreement between photographers on the proper valuation of 
publication as compared to the proper valuation of the contest. 
71 Indeed, since 2004, all Creative Commons licenses require attribution as a condition of 
use as there was insufficient demand for licenses that did not. See supra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
72 Subjects in all conditions reported WTA significantly higher than what a rational 
choice model would predict ($10). These results align, as we have already noted, with the 
findings of our previous experiments. Nonetheless, we can check whether the subjects 
understood the basic structure of the task by comparing what the subjects reported regarding 
their self-perceived probability of winning the contest with reported WTA. If the subjects 
understood the task, as the former increases, so too should the latter. And we do see a strong 
association between subjects’ reported percentage chance to win and their WTA: the 
coefficient of correlation (r) between the probability of winning and WTA is .38, which is 
significantly different than 0, and indeed the reported probability of winning emerges as by 
far the most predictive factor of WTA in a regression analysis. 
We should note that although the strong correlation between the subjects’ perceived 
probability of winning the contest and their WTA suggests that the participants understood 
the task and behaved rationally given their perceptions of their chances, the subjects’ 
subjective perception of the likelihood that they would prevail are, on average, significantly 
overoptimistic. Only 5.6% of the sample reported that they believed their probability of 
winning was 1% or lower, the probability if the judges picked the winner of the contest at 
random. Fully 47.2% of the sample responded that their chances of winning were better than 
50%. As an illustration, a well-calibrated, rational sample could have at most two 
participants reporting their chances were 50% and the rest reporting 0. A well-calibrated, 
rational sample will have a sum of probabilities of winning (for 180 subjects, each of whom 
was led by the experimenters to believe that he had a 1% average chance of winning) of 
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B. Experiment 2: Valuing Attribution – Professional and Advanced Amateur 
Photographers 
1. Methods and Results 
We turned next to investigate whether professional and advanced amateur 
photographers would behave differently from the casual snapshooters in our 
mTurk subject pool. We recruited eighty-eight participants with the aid of two 
photography affinity groups, the Charlottesville Photography Initiative (CPI), a 
membership group of professional and advanced amateur photographers based 
in Charlottesville, Virginia, and Photo District News (PDN), the largest U.S. 
monthly magazine for professional photographers. In contrast to subjects in the 
mTurk sample, who reported spending an average of 5.56 hours per week on 
photography, the participants in the CPI/PDN sample reported spending an 
average 21.24 hours per week on photography. Fully 72.4% of subjects in the 
CPI/PDN sample reported spending at least ten hours per week on 
photography, compared to the 81.7% of subjects in the mTurk sample who 
spent fewer than ten hours per week on photography. 
The study design was identical to that used for the mTurk participants, with 
subjects randomly assigned to the Contest, Publication, or Attribution 
conditions. Eleven participants were excluded from analysis due to failure to 
understand the rules of the experiment. The remaining seventy-seven 
participants showed a pattern somewhat different from the mTurk sample. As 
with the mTurk subjects, participants in the Attribution condition reported a 
WTA lower than that reported by the pooled Contest and Publication subjects, 
and the difference was on the edge of significance at the .05 level 
(Contest/Publication M = 380.44, Attribution M = 234.79, t = 1.97, p = .052). 
Unlike in the mTurk study, however, the dyadic comparisons revealed that 
participants in the Attribution condition reported significantly lower WTA than 
those in the Contest condition (Contest M = 440.25, Attribution M = 234.79, t 
= 2.098, p = .044). Compared to the condition in which creators were merely 
offered a chance to win the $1000 prize, subjects who were offered a chance to 
have their photographs appear in a major media outlet with their names 
attached reduced their WTA by almost fifty percent. 
Interestingly, in this sample of professional and serious amateur 
photographers, the pattern of the WTA responses was consistent with the 
 
180%. Compare that to the sum of probabilities observed – which amount to 7862.4% (!) – 
and you begin to understand the extent to which overoptimism shapes our results. 
Additionally, and importantly, none of the other measures differed as a function of 
condition. If the subjects understand the task correctly, their predicted probability of 
winning should not change between conditions, as the assumptions about the likelihood of 
winning (for example, how many other participants there are, the estimated quality of the 
other participant’s photos, and so forth) do not vary. The fact that perceived probability of 
winning stays roughly constant across conditions suggests that differences in WTA are 
being driven by the individual’s valuation of publication and attribution. 
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hypothesis that creators attach some positive value to publication even in the 
absence of attribution, although the data, given our smaller sample size, do not 
reach statistical significance (Contest M = $440.25, Publication + Attribution 
M = $287.90, t = 1.66, p = .10). It is possible that a larger sample would reduce 
the variability of our data resulting in significant differences between Contest 
and Publication and between Publication and Attribution.73 These results are 























73 Once again, differences in the other dependent variables failed to emerge between 
conditions. Most important, participants were not more likely to believe in their probability 
of winning the contest as a function of the condition, nor did their valuation of the 
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a: means differ at a p < .10 level 
b: means differ at a p < .05 level 
2. Discussion 
As in the mTurk study, the CPI/PDN study broadly aligns with our previous 
experiments involving poems and paintings.74 In all of these instances, creators 
reported WTAs that were, on average, far above what the rational choice 
model would predict. And in the CPI/PDN study, professional and advanced 
amateur photographers reported average WTAs that were even higher than the 
significantly inflated WTAs reported by the casual snapshooters in the mTurk 
study. One might hypothesize that the subjects in our CPI/PDN study would 
have reported lower WTAs than those in the mTurk study because they had, on 
average, far more experience as photographers and would therefore have a 
more realistic appraisal of their photograph’s chance of winning the contest. 
But we saw no such effect.75 
Second, and most important, the data from the CPI/PDN subjects suggest 
that professional and advanced amateur photographers place a somewhat 
greater value on the prospect of publication with attribution compared with 
their mTurk counterparts. CPI/PDN subjects’ WTA in the Attribution 
condition was lower by a significant amount compared to the Contest subjects’ 
WTA. This is fairly strong evidence that creators attach some substantial value 
to credited publication of their work. 
Using the subjects’ responses, we can roughly calculate the value they 
attach to the prospect of publication with attribution. The difference in mean 
WTA between those in the Attribution condition and those in the Contest 
condition is $205.46. But the photographers only would have received 
attributed publication if their photograph won the prize. Thus, the average 
value they assigned to attribution can be thought of as the difference between 
the conditions’ means divided by subjects’ perceived chance of winning the 
prize. Across conditions, subjects’ mean expected probability of winning the 
prize was 49.5%. Accordingly, the creators’ behavior indicates that they valued 
attribution at $415.07.76 We observe a similar pattern, though to a lesser 
 
74 See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 43; Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 25. 
75 If anything, the opposite proved to be the case: the CPI/PDN subjects reported an even 
higher perceived likelihood of winning the contest, though not significantly so (mTurk M = 
43.68 (27.58), CPI/PDN M = 48.42 (32.80), t = 1.11, n.s.). This even more intense 
overoptimism translated into higher WTA: again, we found a powerful correlation between 
the perceived chance of winning and WTA (mTurk r = .239, CPI/PDN r = .383, both 
coefficients of correlation being significant at the .001 level). 
76 This is consistent with research showing that 50% probability often represents 
“epistemic uncertainty,” rather than an actual estimation of a 0.5 probability of the event 
occurring. See Wändi Bruine de Bruin et al., What Number is “Fifty-Fifty”?: Redistributing 
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degree, in the mTurk sample. The difference in WTA between the Contest and 
Attribution conditions was $45.07, and the estimated probability of winning 
across conditions was 42.38%, indicating a valuation of attribution of $106.35. 
Again, this is broadly in line with what we would expect and what our overall 
results suggest: our professional and advanced amateur photographers value 
attribution far more than do our casual snapshooters. 
We should emphasize, however, that although the prospect of publication 
with attribution does meaningfully reduce WTA, the subjects in the Attribution 
condition still reported a mean WTA enormously in excess of what the rational 
choice model would predict ($234.79 compared to an expected value of $10). 
Thus, at least based on this study, we do not believe that the prospect of 
attribution is sufficient to eliminate the creativity effect shown in previous 
experiments. 
A third, related observation arises from a comparison of subjects’ WTA in 
the mTurk and CPI/PDN studies with those reported in the earlier poetry and 
painting studies. Mean WTA in every condition in both the mTurk and 
CPI/PDN studies exceeded the average rational choice expected value of the 
prize by a multiple far greater than mean WTA reported in either the poetry or 
painting studies.77 Why might this be? 
One difference between those studies was the size of the prize offered for 
winning the contest. In the poetry and painting studies, these were $50 and 
$100, respectively, and both prior studies involved contests with 10 
participants, so the average rational choice expected value of the prize in those 
studies was therefore $5 and $10, respectively.78 In the mTurk and CPI/PDN 
studies, by contrast, the contest offered a $1000 prize with a pool of 100 
participants, resulting in an average expected value of $10. In each study, 
creators’ WTA was a multiple of the rational expected value, but the multiples 
grew along with the size of the prize on offer.79 One might have hypothesized 
 
Excessive 50% Responses in Elicited Probabilities, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 713, 714 (2002)); 
Barauch Fischhoff & Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Fifty-Fifty = 50%?, 12 J. BEHAV. 
DECISIONMAKING 149, 150 (1999). We do use a slider scale that represents the entire range 
from 0% to 100%, which Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin show reduces (but does not 
eliminate) this response bias. Obviously, it would be highly irrational for subjects to believe 
they have a 50% chance of winning a contest with 100 entries. Nonetheless, subjects’ 
probability estimates do vary consistently with increases or decreases in their WTA 
amounts. 
77 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 39 (reporting a mean WTA 
for painters of $74.59 for a prize with a rational expected value of $10); Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 22, 24 (reporting a mean WTA for poem authors of 
$22.90 in the “eyes closed” contest, $20.05 in the “eyes open” contest, and $18.92 in the 
lottery experiment for a prize with a rational expected value of $5). 
78 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 37; Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 19. 
79 The results seem fairly large in absolute dollar amounts. Relative to the total possible 
prize (which was the maximum amount they could report), however, the rates were on a par 
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that a larger prize would focus subjects’ attention on the value of their chance 
and would therefore move subjects’ WTA closer to the rational choice value. 
Alternatively, one might have hypothesized that a larger prize would be so 
attractive to subjects, and the prospect of winning so alluring, that the subjects’ 
average WTA would grow along with the prize. This second hypothesis 
obviously fits better with our data: our subjects appear to be focusing 
substantially more on the magnitude of the prize than on the probability of 
winning it.80 Of course, we have not yet tested this proposition directly, and 
our results are therefore, on this point, only suggestive. Nonetheless, our 
findings raise the possibility that the larger average valuation in this study 
relative to our earlier work means that in IP markets in which the “winner” can 
expect to reap large rewards, creators will be especially prone to overvalue 
their chances of prevailing, and consequently the value of their work. 
C. Experiment 3: Studying a Default Attribution Right 
The results of the experiments reported above indicate that creators value 
attribution and are willing to sacrifice financial benefits to obtain it. These 
results could have important implications in the debate about default 
attribution rights in IP law. Those studies did not, however, specifically test the 
effects of creating a default attribution right similar to what we find in the 
copyright laws of many European countries, a feature that some have 
suggested American law should adopt. In order to enter more directly into the 
debate over attribution rights, we conducted a third study, employing a wholly 
different research protocol, to evaluate the economic effects of a default 
waivable attribution right. 
Default rules, which dictate legal outcomes when parties are silent, are a 
prominent feature of the law, and they have been widely studied by social 
scientists and legal scholars.81 According to economic theory, in the absence of 
 
with the previous results. In the current studies, the WTA averages range from 13.23% to 
22.68% (mTurk sample) and from 23.48% to44.03% (advanced and professional samples) 
of the total possible prize. For comparison, the IP creators in the painting study reported an 
average WTA of 74.59% of the $100 prize, while the IP creators in the poetry study 
reported WTA averages of 37.84% to 45.80% of the $50 prize. See supra note 77. 
80 For similar findings, see Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, 
and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (2001) 
(finding that the typical subject was willing to pay $10 to avoid a 99% chance of a painful 
electric shock, and $7 to avoid a 1% chance of the same shock). 
81 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83-87 (2008); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 
87, 91 (1989); Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. 
L. Rev. 396, 396 (2009); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of 
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 651 (2006); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo 
Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 611-12 (1997); Jason Scott 
Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 
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transaction costs, default rules should have no effect on people’s behavior. If 
the parties to a contract, for example, would prefer a rule other than the one 
stipulated by the default, they will simply contract around the default.82 The 
same goes for other kinds of default rules, such as those dealing with organ 
donation, employee benefit plans, and insurance rates.83 Imagine that the 
default rule regarding organ donation is not to donate, but you only have to 
check a box to become an organ donor (a small transaction cost). Under these 
conditions, it seems that if you want to be an organ donor, you will simply 
check the box. And the opposite should be true if donation is set as the default 
but you don’t want to donate: you’ll check the box removing yourself from the 
donor list. 
In dozens of studies, however, this economic assumption has been 
rejected.84 Default rules are often incredibly “sticky”: even when transaction 
costs are low or nonexistent, people tend to stay with the default selection 
rather than switching.85 For example, in an experiment testing organ donation 
rates, when the default rule was set as nondonation and subjects had to click a 
box to become a donor, only forty-two percent did so.86 When the default was 
changed to donation, however, eighty-two percent agreed to be donors.87 
Similar findings emerge from the real world.88 These results suggest that the 
default rule can have significant effects on human behavior. We explore some 
of the reasons why below.89 
Our third study is the first to test the power of a waivable default attribution 
right for IP. The study is designed to test not only the power of different 
default rules but also the economic value of the difference between them. 
1. Methods 
For this study, we again recruited subjects from mTurk, advertising for 
subjects who were aspiring photographers interested in having their work 
 
YALE L.J. 615, 615-16 (1990). 
82 Korobkin, supra note 81, at 611. 
83 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 159-82. 
84 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 133 
(2002). 
85 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 34-35; Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: 
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, 
at 193, 197-98 (1991); Korobkin, supra note 81, at 625-30; William Samuelson & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988). 
86 Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338, 
1338 (2003). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (observing that in Germany, where the default is not to donate, only twelve percent 
of people do so, but in Austria, where the default is donation, ninety-nine percent of people 
do). 
89 See infra Part III. 
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entered into a contest. They were offered $2 for participating. Potential 
subjects were directed to a Qualtrics website where the experiment was hosted. 
After reading a consent form, subjects were asked to upload a photograph of 
nature that they had taken. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions. 
In the first condition, which we will refer to here as “Default Attribution,” 
subjects were told that their photograph, along those of four other participants, 
would be shown to a graphic designer who was participating in a design 
contest with a prize of $200. In order to participate in the design contest, the 
designer needed to purchase the rights to use one of the five photographs as the 
basis for his design. Subjects were told that the designer might edit and crop 
the image and add text and other graphics to it. In order to use one of the 
images, the designer would have to strike a deal with the photographer. 
Subjects in the first condition were told that if they made a deal with the 
designer and the designer’s creation won the contest, the finished design would 
appear on a major website with both the designer’s and the photographer’s 
names. The photographer would receive the agreed upon price for the 
photograph, but she would not be eligible to win the $200 contest prize. The 
subjects were then asked to indicate the least amount of money they would be 
willing to accept to allow the designer to use their photograph (WTA:Att). 
After entering WTA:Att, the subjects were then directed to a new screen. 
Here they were told, “Some designers have indicated that they do not want to 
share credit for the design with the photographer.” Subjects were then 
reminded of their WTA:Att. Then they were told, “Now you will be asked to 
indicate the least amount of money you would be willing to accept to allow the 
designer to use your photograph without credit. If you do not care about credit, 
you can put the same price.” They were then asked to specify the least amount 
of money they would be willing to accept to allow the designer to use the 
photograph without attribution (WTA:NoAtt). Subjects were then asked a 
series of follow-up and demographic questions. 
Photographers in this Default Attribution condition were, in effect, selling 
their default right to attribution. Based on our findings from the previous 
studies, we expected that they would demand more money for an uncredited 
use of their image than a credited use (WTA:NoAtt > WTA:Att). 
In the second condition, which we will refer to here as “No Default 
Attribution,” the statements regarding credit were reversed. On the first screen, 
subjects were told that if they licensed the photograph and the design won the 
contest, the final design would appear on a major website with only the 
designer’s name. Subjects were then asked for their willingness to accept this 
uncredited use (WTA:NoAtt). On the next screen they were told, “Some 
designers have indicated that they are willing to share credit for the design with 
the photographer.” The subjects were reminded of their WTA:NoAtt and were 
asked to indicate their WTA with credit (WTA:Att). They then answered a 
series of follow-up and demographic questions. 
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In the No Default Attribution condition, subjects were, in effect, buying 
attribution. Again, our previous studies indicated that since attribution has 
economic value for creators, they should be willing to pay something to 
receive it. They could manifest their willingness to pay for attribution by 
reducing the amount they were initially willing to accept for uncredited use of 
the photo (WTA:NoAtt > WTA:Att). 
2. Results 
The results of this third study confirmed those of the first two reported in 
this Article. As expected, subjects altered the amount of money they were 
willing to accept in ways that were consistent with placing a significant 
economic value on attribution.90 More important, however, this study suggests 
that a waivable default attribution rule could have a significant – and negative 
– effect on the efficiency of markets to license IP. 
In the Default Attribution condition, subjects’ initial WTA:Att for credited 
use of their photos averaged $40.17 (standard deviation = $46.69), while they 
demanded $54.94 (standard deviation = $59.57) for uncredited use of their 
photos (WTA:NoAtt). A paired samples T-Test indicated that this difference is 
highly statistically significant (t(205) = 6.265, p ≪ 0.001). Subjects given an 
opportunity to “sell” their attribution right demanded almost $15 on average to 
do so. 
In the No Default Attribution condition, subjects also altered their 
willingness to accept in a manner consistent with valuing attribution. Their 
initial WTA:NoAtt for uncredited use averaged $42.36 (standard deviation = 
$46.88), yet they were willing to accept only $38.75 (standard deviation = 
$47.90) in order to receive credit (WTA:Att). Again, a paired samples T-Test 
indicated that this difference is highly statistically significant (t(213) = 2.250, p 
= 0.012). Here, subjects who were given an opportunity to “buy” attribution 
(by reducing their WTA) were willing to give up $3.61 to obtain it. 
The most important finding involves the significant difference between how 
subjects in the two conditions valued attribution. When we compare the 
amount that subjects valued attribution across the two conditions, we see that 
the default rule had a substantial effect. When attribution was set as the default 
(WTA:Att), the difference between the two WTA amounts was $14.77, yet 
when attribution was not the default (WTA:NoAtt), the difference was only 
$3.61. An independent samples T-Test indicated a highly significant difference 
between the two conditions (t(418) = 5.24, p = 0.017). When the subjects were 
initially endowed with a right to attribution, they valued it substantially more 
than they did when they were not so endowed and had to purchase it. In our 
study, subjects valued attribution four times higher under the default 
attribution condition than when the default was no attribution. Again, the 
neoclassical model would not predict this result. But it is broadly in line with 
 
90 See infra Table 3. 
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our previous findings and with the voluminous literature limning the 
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3. Discussion 
Before we discuss the legal implications of our findings, it is important that 
we address the possible psychological explanations for our results in 
Experiment 3. According to neoclassical economic theory, the differences in 
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valuation of attribution.91 This is because people’s preferences about 
attribution (or anything else, for that matter) are thought to be stable and 
exogenous to the way the choice is structured.92 That is to say, the amount that 
someone values attribution should not change based on irrelevant aspects of 
how his valuation is elicited. 
Over the course of the last three decades, however, substantial research in 
the behavioral sciences has undermined the assumption that people have stable, 
well-defined preferences.93 In many instances, it seems, people’s preferences 
are constructed by the way choices are framed. This has consistently been 
shown in the context of changes in default rules.94 As we mentioned above, if 
people have stable preferences, then, when transaction costs are small, default 
rules should have no effect. If people do not like the default, they can simply 
switch out of it. But as the organ donation studies show, default rules can be 
very sticky.95 Even when transaction costs are low, people tend to remain with 
the default choice.96 
Even stable, well-defined preferences can sometimes lead to puzzling 
patterns depending on what the default choice is, especially in situations where 
it is unclear how to value the item in question. For example, people are 
incredibly consistent in valuing novel pain experiences in relation to one 
another.97 In one study, participants who were asked to indicate how much 
they would have to be paid to listen to unpleasant noises always demanded 
more money to listen to sixty seconds of the noise than ten seconds of the 
noise.98 Importantly, however, the amounts of money they demanded were 
highly dependent upon whether they saw an irrelevant price of 50¢ or 10¢ 
beforehand.99 Those who saw a higher price demanded more to listen to the 
unpleasant noise, such that often participants in the high-price condition 
demanded more payment for a thirty second noise than participants in the low-
price condition demanded for a sixty second noise.100 There was no 
 
91 See Korobkin, supra note 81, at 611. 
92 Id.  
93 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 
94 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 86. 
95 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 86, at 1338. 
96 Id. 
97 See Dan Ariely et al., “Coherent Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand Curves Without 
Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73, 80-84 (2003) (finding, in an experiment where 
subjects were asked to listen to an annoying sound with varying default “anchor” prices, 
“arbitrary but coherent pricing of painful experiences, even when there is no uncertainty 
about the nature or duration of the experience”).  
98 Id. 
99 Id. (finding a “powerful effect of the anchoring manipulation”). 
100 Id. at 83 fig.I. 
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convergence over several trials, indicating that the impact of the default can 
persist even with experience in the market.101 
This behavior is known as “coherent arbitrariness.”102 People’s preferences 
are coherent when comparing two different conditions to one another. They 
demand more money the more unpleasant the condition, but their preferences 
are arbitrary with respect to the amount of money they assign to each condition 
generally. Subjects have stable preferences between sixty seconds of 
unpleasantness and thirty seconds of unpleasantness, but they are not sure how 
to assign prices to these preferences in the abstract.103 They anchor on an initial 
irrelevant figure and vary accordingly.104 
Compare these results with ours in Experiment 3. Our participants 
presumably have stable preferences that attribution is more valuable than none, 
but they have no strong ideas about how much attribution is worth in a 
vacuum. We found that there is basically no statistically significant difference 
between WTA:Att in the Default Attribution condition ($40.17) and WTA:Att 
in the No Default Attribution condition ($38.75), regardless of whether this 
included attribution rights (t(418) = 0.480, n.s.). In Experiment 3, subjects in 
both conditions set their initial WTA at about $40. Presumably they have 
determined this price by dividing the $200 prize that the designer is competing 
for by the number of photographs the designer is being shown – a completely 
arbitrary price.105 Having set their initial prices, however, participants 
consistently and predictably adjusted in the correct direction to trade 
attribution rights for money. These results look very much like coherent 
arbitrariness: an arbitrary initial valuation when it is unclear how to price, 
followed by coherent valuations that key off the initial price once it has been 
established. 
Coherent arbitrariness helps explain how our participants set their initial 
valuations and how they varied from them, but it does not explain why the 
variation was so different between conditions. This variation is likely an effect 
of the ways in which default rules can affect people’s decisions. Defaults are 
powerful in part because people have a tendency to treat the default as the 
status quo.106 Numerous studies have shown that people tend to be biased in 
 
101 Id. at 82. 
102 Id. at 97. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. See generally Craig R.M. McKenzie et al., Recommendations Implicit in Policy 
Defaults, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 414 (2006); Shlomi Sher & Craig R.M. McKenzie, Information 
Leakage from Logically Equivalent Frames, 101 COGNITION 467 (2006). 
105 Subjects were given no information about the number of designers who were 
competing for the $200 prize, so the subjects could not estimate the designers’ expected 
winnings. Accordingly, there was no reason for them to believe that designers would be 
willing to pay this much to use their photographs. 
106 Korobkin, supra note 81, at 631 (“[T]he default term that governs the parties might 
appear to parties to represent the status quo allocation of rights and responsibilities.”). 
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favor of the status quo.107 This is due, in part, to the possibility that the status 
quo – at least when it gives a person some right or claim – may begin to feel 
like an endowment, something owned by the person, such that changes from 
the status quo then feel like losses of the endowment.108 People are generally 
loss averse, and, as many studies, including our own, have shown, people tend 
to substantially overvalue things with which they are endowed.109 
Another explanation for the stickiness of defaults is based on the possibility 
that people treat defaults as expressions of appropriate or preferred behavior, 
and, in the absence of strong preferences of their own, tend to follow the 
implicit suggestion of the “choice architect.”110 People may assume that the 
default was chosen for a reason and conform with it because they trust the 
signal being sent.111 
Although it is difficult to know, we suspect that the additional value that 
subjects in our study attached to attribution derives primarily from the former 
explanation (status quo bias and loss aversion) rather than any normative or 
expressive content conveyed by the default. In the Default Attribution 
condition, the right to attribution had become part of the subjects’ endowment; 
it was something they owned that they were being asked to sell. Conversely, in 
the No Default Attribution condition, subjects were not initially endowed with 
the attribution right and were asked, in effect, to purchase it by lowering their 
WTA. In both conditions subjects significantly valued attribution, but in the 
first condition, they seemed to have given more weight to losing something 
they already owned than to purchasing something they did not yet own. This 
result is consistent with the expansive literature on the status quo bias and the 
endowment effect. 
We also tested the possibility that the difference in valuations might be 
caused by the expressive nature of the default.112 Our findings did not support 
that hypothesis. We ran an additional pair of conditions that were identical to 
those reported above but in which subjects were explicitly told that the initial 
condition (either Default Attribution or No Default Attribution) was based on 
U.S. copyright law.113 We thought that an explicit mention of the law would 
 
107 See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 86, at 1338; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra 
note 85, at 8. 
108 Korobkin, supra note 81, at 625. 
109 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 31; Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 7-8; Kahneman et al., supra note 85, at 194; 
Kahneman et al., supra note 10, at 1328. 
110 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 83-87; Sher & McKenzie, supra note 104, at 
487; Sunstein, supra note 84, at 114-15 (“It seems reasonable to speculate that in many 
cases, the default rule carries information about ordinary or sensible practice.”). 
111 See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 
339, 340 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2032 (1996). 
112 Sunstein, supra note 84, at 114-15. 
113 Thus, subjects in the Default Attribution condition were told: “Copyright law gives 
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strengthen the expressive signal of the default condition. In fact, however, 
subjects did not value attribution any differently in the two versions of the 
study. This suggests that subjects were responding less to the expressive value 
of the default than to their disposition toward the status quo. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY 
Our previous poetry and painting studies demonstrated significant valuation 
gaps between creators and potential buyers in IP transactions. These valuation 
gaps do not mean that IP transactions never occur; obviously, we see IP 
bought, sold, and licensed in the real world every day. Our initial experiments 
do suggest, however, that because the parties to such transactions might start 
further apart than the neoclassical model would predict, they will be obliged to 
spend more on negotiation to get to a deal. These higher transaction costs mean 
fewer transactions,114 and our results therefore raised the possibility that IP 
markets might be less efficient than previously believed. These markets may 
be clearing at a lower level of output – that is, with fewer valuable deals being 
made – than they would be in the absence of endowment and creativity effects. 
One limitation of our earlier experiments was that the expected payoff was 
purely monetary. This differs from the real world in which the parties – and 
especially the creators – may contemplate a number of possible monetary and 
nonmonetary benefits of transacting. As noted above, there is considerable 
evidence suggesting that creators value opportunities for attribution and 
publication in addition to direct monetary compensation.115 Perhaps, then, the 
gap between creators’ and buyers’ valuations of IP might be substantially 
reduced or even eliminated were the prospect of publication – and especially 
publication with attribution – offered to the sellers/creators. These new 
experiments are, in part, an attempt to improve the ecological validity116 of our 
previous research. 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, our new experiments provide the 
first quantitative measure of the monetary value that creators attach to 
attribution and publication opportunities. Although a considerable body of 
 
you a waivable right to receive credit for your work. That means that you have the right to 
insist upon receiving credit but that you can waive that right if you want to.” Subjects in the 
No Default Attribution condition were told: “Copyright law does not give you an automatic 
right to receive credit for your work, but you may receive credit if you and the designer 
agree to give you credit.” 
114 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1107-10 
(2000). 
115 Buccafusco, supra note 1, at 1152-53. 
116 Marilynn B. Brewer, Research Design and Issues of Validity, in HANDBOOK OF 
RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 3, 12 (Harry T. Reis & 
Charles M. Judd eds., 2000) (defining ecological validity as “whether an effect has been 
demonstrated to occur under conditions that are typical for the population at large”). 
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research has documented creators’ desires for attribution, none of this work has 
attempted to measure attribution’s economic value. Our experiments provide 
new data that can help shape the debate about the desirability of attribution 
rights in the U.S. and abroad. 
A. Building upon the Previous Studies 
The new data we have obtained from the mTurk and CPI/PDN studies 
suggest that attribution opportunities may drive down creators’ selling prices, 
thereby dampening the magnitude of the creativity effect. Our new results 
suggest that creators do attach some value to the prospect of publication with 
attribution, and they reduce their WTA when presented with that prospect. But 
our data also suggest that the prospect of publication with credit is no panacea 
– while we saw statistically significant reductions in both our studies, subjects 
in the Attribution condition in both studies persisted in reporting WTA 
significantly above what the neoclassical model would predict. Although WTA 
dropped substantially in the Attribution condition, the mean WTA numbers 
were still $235117 and $132118 in the CPI/PDN and mTurk studies, respectively. 
Given our findings from the previous experiments, it is unlikely that there 
would have been many buyers willing to pay this much to obtain the creators’ 
chances of winning the prize. In those previous studies, buyers’ WTP amounts 
were usually closer to the rational expected value of the prize.119 We would 
expect that, had we recruited buyers for the current experiments, their WTP 
would have roughly reflected the expected value of the prize, that is, $10 in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
Interestingly, our data also suggest that the prospect of publication without 
attribution has no significant effect in reducing creators’ WTA and may even, 
in some instances, increase it.120 Scholars who commented on our previous 
work had suggested that creators may value having their work “out there.” 
Perhaps these creators merely want to improve the world irrespective of 
financial or reputational gain. They may feel a “warm glow” of pleasure 
knowing that they have made a contribution to knowledge or the arts.121 Some 
Wikipedia editors may feel this way.122 Our study, however, did not detect any 
evidence of such an effect on creators’ WTA. 
 
117 See supra Table 2. 
118 See supra Table 1. 
119 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 40 fig.1 (reporting a mean 
WTP for painting buyers of $17.39 for a prize with a rational expected value of $10); 
Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 22 (reporting a mean WTP for poem 
buyers of $10.38 in the “eyes closed” contest, $9.21 in the “eyes open” contest, and $5.60 in 
the lottery experiment for a prize with a rational expected value of $5). 
120 See supra Table 1 and Figure 1. 
121 James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of 
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464-65 (1990). 
122 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
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Of course, we cannot say that our study proves that creators do not value 
publication absent attribution. There is good reason to think that they do.123 
Our failure to detect any effect on WTA by the prospect of publication may be 
due to the group of subjects we used. Mere publication may have less value in 
the field of photography than it does in the more networked and collective 
environment of Wikipedia. Nonetheless, our data suggest that publication 
without attribution may be viewed negatively by some creators, and perhaps 
more negatively than no publication at all. To the extent that creators believe 
they have a right to be credited for their work, they may dislike the idea of 
having their work published without attribution. 
Thus, at least in the markets for photographs that we have created, 
attribution and publication do not play so strong a role in creators’ utility 
functions that creators are willing to entirely part with their works’ economic 
value to obtain them. While attribution seems to affect the amount of money 
that creators are willing to accept to sell their IP rights, the diminution is small 
relative to the overall magnitude of the creativity effect. Accordingly, while 
bargaining over attribution might make markets for creative or innovative 
goods less inefficient than we previously suggested, it does not appear to 
produce a Coasean world of freely flowing goods in markets for IP. Initial 
distributions of IP rights will still likely be sticky, and otherwise efficient 
bargains will not be made due to creators’ overvaluations. 
B. Evaluating Whether to Provide a Default Right of Attribution 
Even more than the supplement they provide to our previous research, our 
new experiments are valuable for the light they shed on the emerging question 
of whether and how to provide creators a right of attribution. U.S. copyright 
law, which provides creators of a wide variety of artistic and literary works 
with broad rights to control reproduction, distribution, modification, and the 
public performance and display of their works, does not provide most creators 
with any general right to attribution.124 Our research provides quantitative 
empirical evidence for the notion that creators significantly value attribution. 
Scholars who contend that a right of attribution should be protected by U.S. 
copyright law may claim support for their position in the value that creators 
attach to attribution in our studies. Creators were potentially willing to 
sacrifice a significant amount of cash in order to have their names attached to 
their photographs if they won. As noted above, the estimated value that the 
professional photographers attached to publication with attribution was 
 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 72-74 (2006) (contending that Wikipedia authors 
derive pleasure from writing, and agree to abide by particular writing norms to participate in 
a common publishing endeavor); Garon, supra note 23, at 99-100. 
123 See Garon, supra note 23, at 100-02. 
124 The exception to this rule includes the narrow rights granted under VARA. See supra 
note 25. 
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$415.07.125 From this perspective, creators’ statements about the desire for 
attribution do not merely appear to be post hoc rationalizations of prior 
behaviors or of community norms but rather explicit ex ante trade offs when 
they have skin in the game. 
As described above, scholars who support the provision of attribution rights 
differ on the underlying reasons for doing so.126 Some scholars believe that 
creators deserve rights of attribution because of the moral connection between 
authors and their works.127 These scholars may find support in our research 
because it provides quantitative evidence that creators do in fact care about 
attribution. Nonetheless, economic considerations are typically not paramount 
in moral-rights theories, so the specific tradeoffs that creators make between 
attribution and money may be less relevant. 
For those scholars who promote attribution rights from a utilitarian 
perspective, the significant positive value that creators attach to attribution may 
seem to support provision of such rights.128 Yet it does not follow that the U.S. 
should include a right to attribution in the law simply because creators value 
it.129 From a utilitarian perspective, attribution, just like any other aspect of IP 
rights, should be assigned in such a way that it is likely to reduce transaction 
costs and generate efficient bargains.130 In light of the findings of our third 
experiment, our research seems to undermine utilitarian arguments for creating 
a waivable attribution right.131 
 
125 See supra text accompanying note 76. 
126 See Tushnet, supra note 51, at 792-93. 
127 See Kwall, supra note 31, at 985-86; Tushnet, supra note 51, at 792-93. 
128 See Fromer, supra note 31, at 1791 (citing this Article). 
129 And indeed, the obverse is true: we may wish to include such a right in law even if 
creators did not assign economic value to it. Some moral-rights theorists support an 
attribution right on the grounds that it is ethically required as a matter of the creator’s 
relationship with her work. This is the moral value we discussed earlier. See Kwall, supra 
note 31, at 986; supra text accompanying note 34. Our work does not distinguish any 
potential component of moral value in measuring the overall value that creators assign to 
attribution. Of course, for those viewing IP through an economic lens, the value that creators 
place upon attribution – whatever its source – is due consideration in the enterprise of 
structuring efficient property rules. 
130 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
131 Jeanne Fromer has recently argued that creators may find attribution as an “expressive 
incentive” motivating them to create more and better works. Fromer, supra note 31, at 1790-
98. She suggests that because attribution may be relatively inexpensive for IP law to 
provide, the creation of default attribution rights could reduce the law’s reliance on more 
expensive creation incentives like exclusionary rights. Id. This could in fact be the case. It is 
unclear, however, whether creators actually do perform better when attribution is offered to 
them ex ante or whether they simply value it ex post. Additionally, any benefits from such a 
change would have to be weighed against the costs that we describe in this Article. For 
purposes of this Article, we will assume that the kinds of tradeoffs between incentive 
regimes Fromer describes will not happen and that the provision of a default attribution right 
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Our previous studies suggested that large bargaining gaps are likely to exist 
between creators and licensors of IP due to creators’ systematic overvaluation 
of their work.132 These bargaining gaps create substantial transaction costs that 
likely lead to inefficient markets and a suboptimal number of transactions.133 
The findings reported in this Article imply that creators are willing to 
significantly decrease the amount of money they are willing to accept to 
license their work in exchange for attribution. Under the current copyright 
regime in the U.S., creators who desire attribution must bargain for it – that is, 
they will often have to lower their minimum WTA in order to receive 
attribution. Accordingly, compared to a regime with a default attribution right, 
the current U.S. copyright system probably results in more efficient (albeit 
likely still far from perfectly efficient) bargaining. 
The results of Experiment 3 bring this issue to light most clearly. All of the 
experiments reported in this article imply that creators attach significant value 
to attribution, that is, they have fairly stable preferences to the effect that 
attribution is valuable and that they are willing to trade off money to receive 
attribution. Importantly, however, the specific amount at which creators value 
attribution is deeply unstable and subject to significant framing effects based 
on the default rule. When attribution is not provided as a default right but must 
be purchased by creators, they lower their WTA by a modest but nonetheless 
significant amount to purchase attribution. But when the initial entitlement is 
reversed – that is, when attribution is made part of creators’ default 
complement of rights – creators are willing to part with their default attribution 
rights only for substantial amounts of money. In our study, creators valued 
attribution about four times more when attribution was provided as a default 
than when it was not.134 
In other words, an endowment effect – a significant gap between WTP and 
WTA – appears to attach to the right of attribution when it is structured as a 
default that creators must contemplate trading away. This is consistent with 
much social scientific research on default rules and the status quo. Legal rights 
that are structured as defaults are in a sense “owned,” just like any other form 
of property, and the owners of those default legal rights will tend to be resistant 
to parting with them. They will demand more money to sell a right to 
attribution than they would have been willing to pay to receive it. 
When parties to IP transactions are bargaining over both use of the work and 
the provision of attribution, we should expect fewer efficient transactions when 
creators are given default attribution rights. Because creators value attribution 
more highly when the right is structured as a default entitlement, the initial 
valuations of the parties to IP transactions will be forced further apart when a 
right to attribution is structured as a waivable default held by the creator. Our 
 
would not occur with a complementary diminution in other rights. 
132 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 39-40. 
133 Id. at 47. 
134 See supra Part II.C.3. 
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studies on the creativity effect indicated that significant bargaining gaps will 
arise between creators and purchasers of IP and that these gaps will lead to 
inefficient IP markets.135 The results of the experiments reported in this Article 
suggest that those bargaining gaps will grow substantially if attribution is 
provided as a default entitlement. In a world where creators do not receive 
attribution but desire it, they will tend to have to reduce the price of access to 
their work in order to obtain attribution. By contrast, in a world where creators 
receive attribution as a default, those who desire to use a creator’s work 
without attribution will have to overcome both the creativity effect and the 
endowment effect that attaches to the attribution right. These considerations 
suggest that we need to think carefully before changing U.S. law to incorporate 
a default right to attribution. 
To see how creators’ asymmetric valuation of attribution may worsen 
inefficiencies in IP licensing markets, consider an example where a car 
company wishes to use a band’s song in one of its commercials. The band 
likely will attach significant worth to attribution, because it will likely value 
the economic and moral dimensions of receiving credit for its work. The car 
company may or may not consider the provision of attribution to be costly to 
itself. Whatever the case, having a default rule providing attribution is likely to 
impede efficient bargaining for the use of the song. 
First consider the situation where the company does not attach any cost to 
providing attribution. As our research on the creativity effect suggested, there 
may initially be a significant gap between what the company is willing to pay 
and what the band is willing to accept for the use of the song. Since the band 
desires attribution, however, in a regime without a default attribution right, the 
company can use the band’s preference for attribution to negotiate a lower use 
price. Experiments 1 and 2 in this Article indicate that the band may be willing 
to reduce its WTA in order to receive credit. This will diminish the initial gap 
between WTA and WTP and increase the likelihood that the parties will reach 
an efficient bargain.136 
Now consider a situation where the company does attach a significant cost 
to providing attribution, perhaps because it believes that including the 
additional information on the commercial will distract viewers. Again, there 
will likely be a gap between WTP and WTA. In a regime where there is no 
default attribution right, the two parties will be able to negotiate over the 
provision of attribution. Presumably, if the band does not receive credit, the 
company will have to increase the amount that it is willing to pay the band, or 
if the band receives credit, the band will have to decrease the amount that it is 
willing to accept. In either case, there is a higher likelihood of the parties 
 
135 See Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 52. 
136 See Russell Korobkin, Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?, 11 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 162, 196 (2009) (showing that the distance between parties’ initial offers is inversely 
correlated with the likelihood of successful bargaining). 
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reaching an agreement because they will be starting from closer initial 
values.137 
The situation is different, however, in a regime where there is a default 
attribution right and the user attaches a cost to providing attribution. Now, in 
addition to the bargaining gap associated with the use price, there will also be 
an increased bargaining gap in the price of attribution. As Experiment 3 
suggests, the amount that the company would have to pay to avoid providing 
attribution will be substantially higher than it will be under the no-default 
attribution regime. Our data indicate that the band is likely to attach a 
significantly higher value to attribution under the default attribution regime. 
Thus, the parties will have to overcome significant bargaining gaps for both the 
use rights and the attribution rights, thereby increasing transaction costs and 
decreasing the likelihood of reaching an agreement. 
Accordingly, in our example, providing a default attribution right has two 
negative effects on efficient bargaining. First, compared to a no-default-
attribution regime, the default-attribution regime sacrifices the benefit of 
requiring the creator to bargain over attribution. This is a loss, because if that 
negotiation occurred, it would likely drive down the creator’s price and 
increase the likelihood of an agreement. Second, and perhaps more important, 
providing a default right to attribution will significantly increase the amount 
that the creator values attribution and thus the amount that the user will have to 
pay to avoid providing it. This will further undermine the chance of reaching a 
mutually acceptable bargain. Recall that this increased value of attribution does 
not likely reflect any exogenous value that the creator experiences – the sort of 
value that the neoclassical model recognizes as the basis for preferences. 
Instead, it is simply an artifact of the framing of preferences subject to 
different default rules. There may be some who will argue that the law should 
respect preferences no matter how they are produced. We disagree with this 
view. Where preferences are constructed, at least in part, by our choice of legal 
rules, they are within the law’s power to shape, both in fact and as a normative 
matter – at least if one choice of legal rule, and the preferences that flow from 
it, will lead to more efficient outcomes. 
In any event, providing attribution will often be costly. Indeed, some 
creative industries – motion picture and software in particular – have objected 
to an attribution requirement, arguing that providing attribution to the large 
number of people who provide creative input to a movie or a software product 
would be impractical and would interfere with private arrangements within the 
industry that determine who is credited for creative work.138 If these claims are 
true, then reforming U.S. law to include a default right of attribution would 
require licensors in a range of IP transactions to purchase creators’ attribution 




138 See Fisk, supra note 1, at 77. 
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These experiments indicate that, all else being equal, altering U.S. copyright 
law to provide creators with default attribution rights can result in higher 
transaction costs and less efficient transacting. Still, understanding whether the 
shift from the current U.S. rule to a default rule in favor of creators’ attribution 
would be beneficial involves yet another layer of analysis. In a world of 
significant transaction costs, the Coase Theorem advises us to avoid as many 
costly transactions as possible by granting initial entitlements to those likely to 
value them the most.
139
 Our findings suggest, however, that this relatively 
simple formula can in some instances lead to inefficient allocations. 
If transaction costs created by overvaluation of a default right to attribution 
– what we can refer to as “behavioral transaction costs,” or “bias costs” – 
outweigh the ordinary transaction costs recognized by the neoclassical model, 
it may be best to keep U.S. law as it is. In such an instance, adding a default 
right to attribution to U.S. IP law could on balance worsen, rather than reduce, 
inefficiencies in IP licensing markets. On the other hand, if under most 
circumstances ordinary transaction costs outweigh bias costs, then a switch to a 
default attribution right would make sense. 
In order to know which policy is preferable, more data on IP markets is 
necessary. Over the run of IP transactions, how often are bias costs likely to 
outweigh traditional transaction costs? And how often will the obverse be true? 
These data are not yet available, and they might differ between industries.140 
For the moment, our findings suggest reason for caution given that scenarios in 
which bias costs outweigh neoclassical transaction costs are far from 
implausible. In Experiment 3, creators valued attribution four times higher 
when it was given as a default compared to when it was not. Admittedly, these 
laboratory findings do not necessarily reflect how large bias costs are likely to 
be in the wide array of real-world IP transactions. Nonetheless, they do suggest 
the existence of situations in which bias costs outweigh neoclassical 
transaction costs, and where the more efficient default rule does not allocate 
the initial entitlement to the party who values it most. 
We wish to emphasize that our research does not definitively answer 
questions about the value of providing attribution rights. Whether IP laws 
should incorporate an attribution right is a complicated question mixing 
economic and moral considerations, to which our data provide nothing close to 
a full answer. They do, however, provide new insight into the economic value 
of attribution. From an economic perspective, the law’s decisions about such 
matters should be the result of carefully weighing the costs and benefits of the 
right. While our data cannot fully describe these, they do point to some 
previously overlooked costs of creating a default waivable attribution right. 
 
139 See Coase, supra note 8, at 19. 
140 For example, the amount at which creators value attribution may differ depending on 
whether different media and industries have different norms about the provision of 
attribution. 
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Finally, our arguments apply to the prospect of adopting a waivable 
attribution right. Recall, however, that some European countries have 
established nonwaivable attribution rights.141 In such a situation, the parties 
cannot transact at all over whether attribution is provided.142 Thus, in instances 
where it costs something to the licensee to provide attribution, and where 
transacting to waive it would leave both parties better off (that is, where the 
cost to the publisher outweighs the benefit to the rightsholder), having a 
nonwaivable right introduces an intractable inefficiency into the licensing 
market. In such cases, we would expect deal prices to fall, although it is 
difficult to say by how much. This situation would be difficult to model 
experimentally, at least with a protocol like ours, because transacting over 
attribution would not be possible by definition. 
C. Wider Implications for Property Theory and the Efficient Structuring of 
Default Rules 
Beyond questions associated with attribution rights and IP, this research has 
important implications for a number of different substantive areas. Whenever 
the law is confronted with a situation involving the efficient distribution of 
entitlements, it will have to confront the issues raised by our findings on the 
costs of defaults. Experiment 3 suggests that a party who enjoys a default legal 
right as part of her initial complement of rights will tend to treat that legal right 
in a fashion similar to any other form of initial entitlement and overvalue it 
relative to what neoclassical theory would predict. That is, what the 
endowment effects literature suggests is true for property – that property is 
valued more highly merely as a consequence of ownership – may be true also 
for a wide class of other legal entitlements. Many legal entitlements – 
including contract default rules, employment rules, and the availability of 
certain kinds of remedies – may generate attachments and overvaluation in the 
hands of their initial owners. In those cases, standard applications of law and 
economics theories will not result in efficient or welfare-maximizing 
outcomes. 
 
141 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
142 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 81, at 87 (“Immutable rules cannot be contracted 
around; they govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them.”); Guido Calabresi 
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). Cass Sunstein writes:  
Of course, many statutes create nonwaivable rights. They bypass the question of 
default rules entirely by banning bargaining altogether. There are many reasons why 
legislatures and courts might take this approach. Perhaps third-party effects argue 
against waiver. Perhaps waivers would be inadequately informed; behavioral 
economics offers a number of reasons why this might be so. Perhaps nonwaivable 
rights can be justified, in the context of accommodation mandates, on redistributive 
grounds.  
Sunstein, supra note 84, at 108. We think that the typical situation involving bargaining 
over attribution does not satisfy these requirements for limiting transactional freedom. 
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Our findings suggest two deep, even foundational, difficulties with the 
Coase Theorem. One involves the appropriate distribution of entitlements in a 
world without transaction costs and the other in a world in which transaction 
costs exist. The Coase Theorem holds that in the absence of transaction costs, 
it does not matter where the law locates initial entitlements: if the initial 
distribution is inefficient, the parties will simply relocate it through a voluntary 
transaction. For example, if the law gives an entitlement to A but B values it 
more than A does, A and B will simply transfer the entitlement for some 
amount of money between the two valuations. 
Our findings suggest that the very act of locating an initial entitlement with 
one party to a transaction may cause that party to overvalue that initial 
entitlement. This means that the very enterprise of distributing initial 
entitlements may inherently create transaction costs.143 That is, while the 
Coase Theorem holds in the neoclassical world of exogeneity and stability of 
preferences, in a world where preferences are endogenous and vary based on 
the way initial ownership is structured, it breaks down. Parties face increased 
transaction costs in negotiating, as we have explained. And that is true even 
when the transaction at issue does not involve property but the transfer of a 
right.144 Coase employed such an example in The Problem of Social Cost, his 
famous article setting out the Coase Theorem.145 He based his discussion in 
part on a nuisance case named Sturges v. Bridgman, where a noisy 
confectioner and a quiet doctor were neighbors and went to court to see who 
should have to move. Coase suggested that regardless of whether the judge 
ruled that the confectioner had to stop using his machinery, or that the doctor 
had to put up with it, they could strike a mutually beneficial bargain about who 
moves, thus achieving an efficient outcome.146 Nothing we have said suggests 
that the parties in this case, or others, cannot strike mutually beneficial 
bargains. But to think that they may ever be able to do so from a baseline of 
zero transaction costs is implausible. If the very enterprise of distributing 
entitlements causes transaction costs, then the baseline is by definition one 
 
143 See Korobkin, supra note 81, at 675; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, 
Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1555 (1998) (“To be 
sure, the endowment effect could be considered just another transaction cost, under a liberal 
definition of that term. Such treatment would resurrect the truth of the tautological aspect of 
the Coase Theorem (all efficient trades occur in the absence of transaction costs). Unlike 
other impediments to trade, however, judicious allocation of rights and remedies seemingly 
can do little to facilitate trade. Merely allocating a right results in an impediment to further 
trade. Unlike other transaction costs, the law apparently has no power to avoid creating an 
endowment effect.”). 
144 See Russell Korobkin, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a 
Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663, 665 (1994). 
145 Coase, supra note 8, at 9-16. 
146 Id. 
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where the parties face barriers to relocating it via negotiation. In such a world, 
legal rules always matter.147 
Coase’s great contribution was not, of course, to suggest that the world is 
devoid of transaction costs. Rather, the real value of the article was to describe 
how entitlements should be awarded when transaction costs exist.148 According 
to Coase, when transaction costs affect bargains, initial distributions of rights 
may result in inefficiencies if those costs exceed the gains from trade.149 Thus, 
the law should typically provide the entitlement to the party who is likely to 
value it most, thereby eliminating the necessity of transacting. This explains 
why people are endowed with rights to bodily integrity, homeowners with 
rights of quiet enjoyment, and authors and inventors IP rights. 
The force of this insight erodes in the face of research indicating that 
people’s preferences are unstable and are biased in favor of ownership. 
Endowment effects will tend to make people attach greater value to things that 
they own compared to things that they are considering purchasing.150 We can 
think of the gaps between WTA and WTP that arise due to ownership as “bias 
costs.” If bias costs significantly increase the minimum payment that the owner 
of the default is willing to accept, purchasers of those rights might not be 
willing to pay enough to obtain the rights although they would have obtained 
them in the absence of bias costs. For that reason, in situations where bias costs 
are (a) significant (so that they may outweigh traditional transaction costs) and 
(b) asymmetric between the two parties to a transaction (that is, where one 
party exhibits greater bias than the other), it might be valuable to initially 
provide the right to the party that overvalues it the least. 
Determining whether bias costs exceed transaction costs and how many 
such cases exist is, of course, a difficult empirical question. But our research 
suggests that the scenario is at least plausible. Accordingly, the law should not 
unthinkingly follow the Coase Theorem’s demands that entitlements always be 
given to those who are likely to value them most. Doing so may, in fact, 
increase inefficiency. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars have often addressed the value that creators attach to publication 
and attribution, yet little research has attempted to empirically test the 
existence or magnitude of that value. These experiments have done so with 
interesting and suggestive results. Our research indicates that creators do 
assign significant value to attribution but limited if any value to publication on 
its own. The amount that they value attribution, however, does not completely 
 
147 Sunstein, supra note 84, at 109 (“When the endowment effect is at work, preferences 
and valuations are affected by the initial allocation of the entitlement; contrary to the Coase 
Theorem, there is no prelegal ‘preference’ from which the legal system can work.”). 
148 Coase, supra note 8, at 15-19. 
149 Id. 
150 Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 31. 
 
2013] WHAT’S A NAME WORTH? 147 
 
eradicate the valuation gaps and market inefficiencies that we have found 
previously. Moreover, our research suggests that from a utilitarian perspective, 
providing a default waivable attribution right may make matters worse. 
Future research is needed to test the robustness of our findings. Moreover, 
our experiments all focused on a single medium, photography, that typically 
has low expectations of attribution. It is possible that in other media where 
attribution is standard – for example, painting, literature, and music – the value 
creators attach to it will be greater. It would also be worth comparing our 
findings to situations, such as open source computer coding, in which the value 
that creators attach to attribution results in free access to content. 
 
